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MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE PROHIBITING ANONYMOUS
HANDBILLS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Talley v. California
362 U.S. 60 (1960)
The defendant was convicted and fined $10 in a Los Angeles Municipal
Court for violating a municipal ordinance making it a criminal offense to
distribute "any handbill in any place under any circumstances," unless it
had printed on it the name of the person who sponsored, printed, or distri-
buted the bill.1 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the
ordinance void on its face as an invasion of freedom of speech and press
protected in the first and fourteenth amendments.2
Municipal ordinances, adopted under the authority of a state, comprise
state action, and as such, fall under the scrutiny of the fourteenth amend-
ment protecting the fundamental liberties of speech and press against state
infringement.3 The constitutional right to express one's views in orderly
fashion extends to the communication of ideas by the use of handbills,
circulars, and pamphlets as well as by the spoken word.4 Furthermore, the
cloak of protection extends to distribution as well as publication.5 Liberty
to circulate literature has been held as essential to freedom as the liberty
to publish, for one is of little use without the other.6
Immunity does not extend to all forms of speech, however, as other
interests may claim judicial cognizance. 7 State action must be reasonable and
related to the safety or other legitimate interests of the state or its citizens.8
1 Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 28.06:
"No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address
of the following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that
in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to such fictitious name the true
names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the person sponsoring said
hand-bill shall also appear thereon."
2 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
3 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction, 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
4 Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
5 Ibid.
6 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 227 (1887).
7 See e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, (1950); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, (1940).
8 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (compulsory disclosure of lobbyists);
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding Green River ordinance); Feiner
v. New York, supra note 7 (may not create a panic or riot); American Communications
Ass'n CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (may not advocate the violent overthrow of
the government); Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1941); Lewis Publishing Co.
v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) (compulsory disclosure of editor and owners of
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Even though a sufficient state interest be found, a statute which permits
within the scope of its language punishment of incidents within the protec-
tion of the guarantee of free speech is unconstitutional." Thus, licensing
statutes requiring a permit to distribute leaflets,'L or statutes banning any
distribution on the streets" have been held void. Nor will statutes be upheld
which deter the exercise of constitutional freedoms by making the uncertain
line of the fourteenth amendment's application determinative of criminality
and by prescribing indefinite standards of guilt.1
2
When infringement of the rights of speech and press is claimed, the
court must "weigh the circumstances" and "appraise the substantiality of
the reasons advanced" in favor of the challenged regulations.13 The govern-
mental interest, if found sufficient, is weighed against the impact of that
challenged regulation on the freedoms of speech and press. To limit the
exercise of these freedoms, the danger of destruction of life or property must
be clear and present, or the danger of a breach of the peace must be
imminent.14
The Court in the principal case reacted to the all-inclusiveness of the
municipal ordinance regulating "any handbill in any place under any cir-
cumstances." The identification requirement, the majority felt, would tend
to restrict distribution of literature, and thereby limit freedom of expression.
Careful identification of the relevant facts and issues and the judicial
process of weighing competing values is missing from the majority's opinion.
The presentation of the relevant facts and issues is also generally absent from
the briefs of counsel. No reference is made to the operation of the ordinance
or the contents of the handbill distributed by petitioner. The impact upon
protected rights and the resulting injury to Talley is neither discussed nor
adequately presented to the Court. Furthermore, meager evidence was
produced as to the necessity or practicality of the ordinance in question.
Faced with an obvious lack of legislative facts, and motivated by a "pre-
sumption of constitutionality," the dissenters felt the ordinance should stand
in the absense of a showing that restraint upon freedom of speech would
result from the enforcement of the ordinance. On the other hand, the
majority reasoned that the ordinance would have the general effect of
restricting the exercise of protected freedoms. Thus, this freedom of
anonymity was upheld over the state's unsupported contention that the
ordinance itself was not so restricted.
newspapers seeking second-class mail privileges); United States v. Peace Information
Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951) (distribute fraudulent advertising); Annot.,
114 A.L.R. 1446 (1938) (advertising matter); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1484 (1923).
9 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 413 (1936); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931).
10 Schneider v. Irvington, supra note 4.
11 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
12 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948).
13 Lovel v. Griff en, supra note 4.
14 Winters v. New York, supra note 12.
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The majority believed the ordinance fell within the ban set by prior
cases. Yet, as the dissent strongly asserts, the Los Angeles ordinance does
not fall precisely under any of these cases. The earlier cases either "forbade
the distribution" without exception,' 5 without a license,' 6 or created out-
right bans or prior restraints' 7 on the distribution of handbills. The term
"(prior restraint" is used to mean that type of restriction which permits
distribution subject only to the power of a public official to determine what
literature may be distributed and who may distribute it.'8 In this sense,
even though the Los Angeles ordinance prescribed a certain action before
printing, it is not dependent upon the exercise of an official's discretion.
Thus, the Court seems to be building on these past cases rather than
applying them strictly as precedents.
Had the issues and facts been stated with particularity in the principal
case, the outcome would probably not have been different, even though the
previous handbill cases are not precisely in point. The mere existence of
the Los Angeles ordinance may deter the exercise of protected freedoms for
fear of exposure and public hostility. The Court's recognition of this deterrent
effect is expressed in recent cases involving freedom of association. In
NAACP v. Alabama,'9 the Court immunized petitioner's membership lists from
state scrutiny on the ground that members could pursue their lawful interests
privately without fear of arbitrary disclosure. Such disclosure was likely to
have a deterrent effect on the members' freedom to associate and on the
willingness of others to join the NAACP, and indeed, the NAACP showed
that revelations of identity in the past had led to public hostility, coercion,
both physical and economic, as well as loss of employment. Membership
lists were also protected in Bates v. Little Rock 20 because fear of reprisal
might deter peaceful discussions of public matters of importance. The
apparent gap between the principal case and the previous handbill cases
has been filled by the Court's realization of the dangers of exposure of new
or unpopular ideas as expressed in the NAACP cases.
The value of the principal case as precedent is severely limited by the
absence of a presentation and a subsequent investigation of the competing
interests. A recent case, Shelton v. Tucker,2 ' arrived at a similar result by a
more careful evaluation of the interests at stake. Because of the differences
in methods used by the Court in these two cases, further investigation is
inescapable. An Arkansas statute required all teachers in public schools to
submit affidavits listing all organizations to which they had belonged or
contributed within the preceding five years as a prerequisite to employ-
ment.22 This is distinguishable from the NAACP cases and Talley as here
15 Jamison v. Texas, supra note 11.
16 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Schneider v. Irvington, supra
note 4; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
17 Lovell v. Griffen, supra note 4.
18 Schneider v. Irvington supra note 4, at 163.
19 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
21 81 Sup. Ct. 247 (1960).
22 Ark. Stat. ch. 10 §§ 1-7 (1958).
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there is a substantial correlation between the asserted governmental interest
and the state's effort to compel disclosure of organizational affiliations. The
state has an admittedly valid interest in investigating the competence and
fitness of those it hires to teach in its schools, and a state would be con-
cerned about teachers who spent an excessive amount of time in outside
activities, or who were members'of subversive groups. The dissenters assert
that the statute provides a reasonable method of obtaining needed information
even though irrelevant information will also be received. No claim of bias or
discrimination had been made even though the act may have been a veiled
attempt to detect members of certain unpopular organizations. The dissenters
also assert that the act would have to be construed so as to prohibit public
disclosure of the affidavits. This contention does not fully meet the majority's
position and the difference in positions is clarified by an analysis and state-
ment of competing interests. The harm that this act would cause, states the
majority, is the reluctance of teachers to join organizations not held in high
regard by school authorities. This unwillingness to exercise protected rights
is the same interest referred to in Talley; here, however, the interest is
supported by evidence that fear of reprisal is more than theoretical and by an
understanding, although unexpressed, of existing social conditions. Further-
more, the presentation of the affidavits to the school board permits its
scrutiny to fall on those belonging to unpopular groups. Whether Talley
would be harmed by disclosure was not expressed. Assuming that information
on the Arkansas affidavits was kept from public inspection, there is always
the chance that the information will somehow find its way outside. For the
Court to wait for an example of discrimination before it acts, as the dissenters
suggest, would expose some teachers to public hostility and economic loss
as well as deter others from their right to associate. If narrower means of
achieving the legitimate governmental end are possible, and such alternatives
are discussed in this opinion, then a method which broadly stifles personal
liberties cannot be pursued. 23 The careful specification and distinction of
competing interests-the effects of the legislation on the petitioners and on
other members of the affected class, and the state's need for competent
teachers-is a technique to be desired. A more meaningful opinion in Talley,
useful as a precedent in the future, would have specified the legislative facts
and the interests protected.24
Aside from the structural defects, the aim of the Talley majority is
clearly in the direction of the protection of anonymous speech, or, the
protection of anonymity from arbitrary infringement. Two factors must be
considered in the future. First, any regulation designed to prohibit certain
evils should be specifically worded and applied so that individual action
which falls outside the perimeter of such regulation will not be penalized or
deterred. Second, identification requirements will be deemed to restrict the
free expression of beliefs.
A shadow of doubt has been cast upon the validity of corrupt practices
23 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 7.
24 See Karst, "Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation," The Supreme Court
Review, 75-112 (1960).
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acts prohibiting distribution of anonymous publications with reference to
elections or candidates found in over thirty states.25 A federal statute pro-
hibits publications concerning candidates for public office in the federal
government without the names of persons or organizations responsible.26
The Ohio Supreme Court has upheld such a statute27 as being regulatory in
nature and intended to prevent the abuse-of the right of free speech.28 It
must be noted that the Ohio Constitution expressly states that every citizen
may freely speak, write, and publish, "being responsible for the abuse of this
right."2 9 Neither the Ohio statute, nor any other similar state statute, has
ever been brought before the United States Supreme Court as a violation of
the federal constitution. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has given a strong
impetus to the dissemination of political and social views by permitting this
activity to be free from the fears of public action hostile to the ideas being
presented.
25 E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 25-1714 (1949); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 211.08 (1939);
Ohio Rev. Code § 3599.09 (1957) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 3546 (1937).
26 64 Stat. 475 (1950), 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1951), amending 62 Stat. 724 (1948).
27 Ohio Rev. Code § 3599.09 (1957);
"(A) No person shall write, print, post, or distribute . . . a notice, placard . . . or
any other form of publication which is designed to promote the nomination of a candi-
date, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in
any election, unless there appears on such form of publication . . . either the name and
address of the chairman or secretary of the organization issuing the same or the person
who issues, makes or is responsible therefor with his name and address."
28 State v. Babst, 104 Ohio St. 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922).
29 Ohio Const. art. 1, § 11, Bill of Rights.
